As the "agentic web" takes shape-billions of AI agents (often LLM-powered) autonomously transacting and collaborating-trust shifts from human oversight to protocol design. In 2025, several inter-agent protocols crystallized this shift, including Google's Agent-to-Agent (A2A), Agent Payments Protocol (AP2), and Ethereum's ERC-8004 "Trustless Agents," yet their underlying trust assumptions remain under-examined. This paper presents a comparative study of trust models in inter-agent protocol design: Brief (self- or third-party verifiable claims), Claim (self-proclaimed capabilities and identity, e.g. AgentCard), Proof (cryptographic verification, including zero-knowledge proofs and trusted execution environment attestations), Stake (bonded collateral with slashing and insurance), Reputation (crowd feedback and graph-based trust signals), and Constraint (sandboxing and capability bounding). For each, we analyze assumptions, attack surfaces, and design trade-offs, with particular emphasis on LLM-specific fragilities-prompt injection, sycophancy/nudge-susceptibility, hallucination, deception, and misalignment-that render purely reputational or claim-only approaches brittle. Our findings indicate no single mechanism suffices. We argue for trustless-by-default architectures anchored in Proof and Stake to gate high-impact actions, augmented by Brief for identity and discovery and Reputation overlays for flexibility and social signals. We comparatively evaluate A2A, AP2, ERC-8004 and related historical variations in academic research under metrics spanning security, privacy, latency/cost, and social robustness (Sybil/collusion/whitewashing resistance). We conclude with hybrid trust model recommendations that mitigate reputation gaming and misinformed LLM behavior, and we distill actionable design guidelines for safer, interoperable, and scalable agent economies.

Calls for transparency in AI systems are growing in number and urgency from diverse stakeholders ranging from regulators to researchers to users (with a comparative absence of companies developing AI). Notions of transparency for AI abound, each addressing distinct interests and concerns. In computer security, transparency is likewise regarded as a key concept. The security community has for decades pushed back against so-called security by obscurity -- the idea that hiding how a system works protects it from attack -- against significant pressure from industry and other stakeholders. Over the decades, in a community process that is imperfect and ongoing, security researchers and practitioners have gradually built up some norms and practices around how to balance transparency interests with possible negative side effects. This paper asks: What insights can the AI community take from the security community's experience with transparency? We identify three key themes in the security community's perspective on the benefits of transparency and their approach to balancing transparency against countervailing interests. For each, we investigate parallels and insights relevant to transparency in AI. We then provide a case study discussion on how transparency has shaped the research subfield of anonymization. Finally, shifting our focus from similarities to differences, we highlight key transparency issues where modern AI systems present challenges different from other kinds of security-critical systems, raising interesting open questions for the security and AI communities alike.

The e-commerce systems are being tackled from commerce behavior and internet technologies. Therefore, trust aspect between buyer-seller transactions is a potential element which needs to be addressed in competitive e-commerce industry. The e-commerce industry is currently handling two different trust approaches. First approach consists on centralized mechanism where digital credentials/set of rules assembled, called Policy based trust mechanisms . Second approach consists on decentralized trust mechanisms where reputation, points assembled and shared, called Reputation based trust mechanisms. The difference between reputation and policy based trust mechanism will be analyzed and recommendations would be proposed to increase trust between buyer and seller in e-commerce industry. The integration of trust mechanism is proposed through mapping process, strength of one mechanism with the weakness of other. The proposed model for integrated mechanism will be presented and illustrated how the proposed model will be used in real world e-commerce industry.

There are mostly two approaches to tackle trust management worldwide Strong and crisp and Soft and Social. We analyze the impact of integrated trust mechanism in three different e-commerce services. The trust aspect is a dormant element between potential users and being developed expert or internet systems. We support our integration by preside over an experiment in controlled laboratory environment. The model selected for the experiment is a composite of policy and reputation based trust mechanisms and widely acknowledged in e-commerce industry. The integration between policy and trust mechanism was accomplished through mapping process, weakness of one brought to a close with the strength of other. Furthermore, experiment has been supervised to validate the effectiveness of implementation by segregating both integrated and traditional trust mechanisms in learning system

An often neglected issue in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is the potential presence of unreliable agents in the environment whose deviations from expected behavior can prevent a system from accomplishing its intended tasks. In particular, consensus is a fundamental underpinning problem of cooperative distributed multi-agent systems. Consensus requires different agents, situated in a decentralized communication network, to reach an agreement out of a set of initial proposals that they put forward. Learning-based agents should adopt a protocol that allows them to reach consensus despite having one or more unreliable agents in the system. This paper investigates the problem of unreliable agents in MARL, considering consensus as a case study. Echoing established results in the distributed systems literature, our experiments show that even a moderate fraction of such agents can greatly impact the ability of reaching consensus in a networked environment. We propose Reinforcement Learning-based Trusted Consensus (RLTC), a decentralized trust mechanism, in which agents can independently decide which neighbors to communicate with. We empirically demonstrate that our trust mechanism is able to handle unreliable agents effectively, as evidenced by higher consensus success rates.

The most prominent way to establish trust in online markets such as eBay are reputation systems that publish buyer feedback about a seller's past behavior. These systems, however, critically rely on assumptions that are rarely met in real-world marketplaces: first, it is assumed that there are no reporting costs and no benefits from lying so that buyers honestly report their private experiences. Second, it is assumed that every seller is long-lived, i.e. will continue to trade on the marketplace indefinitely and, third, it is assumed that sellers cannot whitewash, i.e. create new accounts once an old one is ran down. In my thesis, I address all of these assumptions and design incentive-compatible trust mechanisms that do not rely on any of the aforementioned assumptions. Moreover, I focus on designs that minimize common knowledge assumptions with respect to the players' valuations, costs and beliefs.